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The respondents in each of the above named cases 
agree with the statement of facts set forth in appel-
lant's brief. 
STATEMENT OF PARTICULAR 
QUESTIONS INVOLVED 
1. Revenue (statutes or statutes imposing liabilities 
must be strictly construed. 
2. There is no lien against the right to use water 
or land for cost of deliv~ry of water unless specifically 
so prescribed by statute. 
3. Claim of State Engineer for services rendered 
pursuant to 100-5-1 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 
i,s not a preferred claim in receivership. 
4. Purchaser of land and wate,r -rig·hts is not per-
sonally liable for obligation of previous owner in con-
nection with distribution of water by State Engineer 
unless he is specifically made so by contract or State 
law. 
ARGUl\1ENT 
Appellant has cited several cases to support the 
principle that a statute in derogation of common law 
shall not be ~strictly construed but shall be construed 
liberally with the view to effect the objects of the 
statute and promote justice. Respondents in this case 
do not see just where this principle has any applica-
tion in these cases for it is not pointed out in appel-
lant's brief what common law is in conflict with the 
statute under consideration, namely, Section 100-5-1, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933.-
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However, in this connection we wish to call the 
court's attention to the case of Mormeister vs. Gold-
ing, 84 Utah 324, 27 Pac. (2) 447, which, in discussing 
the construction of the statute there involved, states 
as follo\vs: 
"It is further well settled that statutes in 
derogation of common law are strictly construed. 
Consequently, the authority of the eourt or any 
board or commission or department to procure 
evidence by a deposition, and to use the same, 
must be clearly conferred and authorized by 
statute.'' 
From appellant's argument there i1s no question 
but that appellant is contending that the statute above 
mentioned is one 'vhich places a_ burden upon the rights 
of an indiYidual or is in effect a revenue law or statute. 
If this contention is true, and it must be true if ap-
pellants are to prevail in their appeal, then it is uni-
formly held by _the courts that such statutes must be 
strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer and against 
the taxing power. 
59 c. J. 1129: 
''A statute creating a new liability, or in-
creasing an existing liability, or even a remedial 
statute giving a remedy against a party who 
would not otherwise be liable, must be strictly 
construed in favor of persons sought to be sub-
jected to their operation. Such statutes will not 
be so extended as to include liabilities other 
than those designated or fairly within its terms." 
59 C. J. 1131: 
''As a general rule revenue la,vs, such as 
la"-:s imposing taxes and licenses, are neither 
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remedial laws, nor laws founded upon any per-
manent public policy; but, on the contrary, 
operate to impose burdens upon the public, or to 
restrict them in the enjoyment of their prop-
erty and the pursuit of their occupations, and, 
when they are ambiguous or doubtful, will be 
construed strictly in favor of the taxpayer and 
against the taxing power. How·ever, the rule 
of strict construction should be applied with due 
regard to the intention of the legislature as ex-
pressed in the statute, and it has been held that 
revenue statutes should be reasonably construed 
\Vith a view to carry out their purposes. and in-
tent. It has also been stated that revenue statutes 
should be c.o:rustrued strictly, i:Q. so far as they 
may operate to deprive the citizen of his prop-
erty, by summary proceedings or to impose 
penalties or forfeitures upon him, but other-
'vise such s·tatutes ought to be construed "rith 
fairness, if not liberality, in order to carry 
out the intention of the legislature. The pro-
visions of such statutes are not to be extended 
by construction or implication beyond the clear 
import of the language used; nor will they be 
enlarged so as to embrace matters or persons 
not specifically named or pointed out. In order 
to sustain the tax, it must come clearly 'vithin 
the letter of the statute, and the powers granted 
to officers charged with its execution must be 
strictly pursued. * * • '' 
Woodring v. Straup, 45 Utah 173, 143 Pac. 592: 
''The rule, as declared by the great weight 
of authority, is that, in determining whether the 
Legislature has granted to municipal corpora-
tions the power to levy and collect special taxes, 
the statutes under which it. is claimed such 
power is conferred are strictly construed. In 
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Suth. Stat. Const. Sec. 363, the author says : 
'' 'A due regard for individual rights and 
the plainest principles of justice requires that 
taxing statutes shall have only the effect which 
the Legislature clearly intended; in construing 
them all reasonable doubts as to such intent 
should be resolved in favor of the citizen.' 
''And again in the same section, it is said: 
'' 'A statute conferring authority to impose 
taxes must be construed strictly. A tax law can-
not be extended by construction to things not 
named or described as the subjects of taxation'.'' 
In 2 Dillon 's· Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.) Sec. 763, the 
rule is well illustrated in the following terse and con-
Cise language : 
' "It is a principle universally de,clared and 
admitted that municipal corporations can levy 
no taxes, general or special, upon the inhabitants 
or their property, unless the pow·er be plainly 
a;nd unmistakably conferred. It has, indeed. 
often been said that it must be specifically 
granted in terrrns; but all courts agTee that the 
authority must be given either in express 'vords 
or by necessary or unmistakable implication, 
and that it cannot be collected by doubtful in-
ferences from other powers, or powers relating 
to other subjects, nor can it be deduced fron1 
any consideration of convenience or advantage,' 
Hamilton's' L~aw of Special Ass·essments, Sec. 195; 
1 Page & Jones Taxation by Asses,sment, Sec. 229; 
37 Cyc. 966; 25 A. & E. Ency, Law, 1171." 
I.J. A. & S. L. Ry. YS. Richards, 52 Utah 1. 172 
Pac. 474: 
"The authorities cited by respondent to the 
effect that laws relating to taxation should be 
strictly construed against the taxing power. are 
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acknowledged and approved. We recognize that 
as thH law, and would readily apply it in the 
present case, if there was anything in the case 
to which it could be applied.'' 
In re Osgood's Estate, 52 ·Utah 185, 173 Pac. 152: 
"While we are aware of, and approve, the 
general rule, that a law which imposes a tax of 
any kind or character cannot be extended by 
construction between the literal terms of the 
statute, yet we also recognize the rule that where, 
as here, all property which passes by will is 
within the express terms of the statute, then the 
burden should fall upon the person who claims 
an exemption under the statute to establish 
that fact.'' 
Norville vs. State Tax Commission, ________ Utah --------, 
97 P. (2) 937: 
''The doctrine that taxing statutes are, in 
case of doubt as to the intention of the legis-
lature to be, construed strictly against the tax-
ing a:uthority and in favor of those on \\'"hom 
the tax is levied, has been well set out in the 
case of Helvering v. _Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 
293 U. S. 84, 55 S. Ct. 50, 79 L. Ed. 211. See, 
al1so, Los Angeles S. L. R. Co. v. Richards, 
52 Utah 1, 172 P. 474; W. F. Jensen Candy Co. 
v. State Tax Commission, 90 Utah 359, 61 P. 2d 
629, 107 A. L. R. 2·61; 25 R. C. L. Sec. 307 at 
p. 1092; Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 11, 4th Ed. 
Sec. 503 at p. 1113. '' 
In the opinion of respondents the statute in ques-
tion clearly indicates that it W3.!S not the legislative 
intention to create a lien of any description against the 
right to the use of water or the land merely for the 
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failure to pay the amounts assessed by the State En-
gineer. In section 100-5-1, which has been set forth in 
appellant's brief, the State Engineer is merely given 
the right to forbid the use of the water by any such 
delinquent. In other words, in this case, had the White 
Fawn ~lilling Company continued to u1se the water, 
the State Engineer had the right to prohibit the use 
thereof until the obligation was paid, and he had the 
right to sue such user for the amount owing. Every 
word used clearly states that the rights of the Engineer 
must be against the person who incurred the obligation 
and not ag·ainst any subsequent purchaser. Nor is there 
anything in the section that even suggests or indicates 
that the legislature intended that a lien should be 
created and exist against the right to the use of water 
or the land upon which it is used. And where the legis-
lature desired to create a lien, it has done so in ~specific 
""ords as in Section 100-5-4, which covers the question 
of headg·ate:s and measuring devices. In this section 
the follow··ing language is used: 
'' * • * If the owners of irrig·ation 'vorks, 
canals or reservoirs Rhall refuse or neglc~t to 
construct and put in such headgates, flumes or 
measuring devices, after thirty dayR notiee to 
do so by the State Engineer, it ~shall be the duty 
of the State Engineer to construct or cause to 
be conRtructed such measuring devices and the 
cost of the same shall be a lien against the 
.lands and ''Tater rights served thereby." 
And to attempt to give to the statute the con-
struction that appellant insists should be giYen 'vould 
be to go contrary to all of the authoritieR in this state 
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and numerous others in construing revenue or tax 
statutes. In order to sustain a tax it must come clearly 
within the letter of the statute. 
Appellant seems to rely entirely upon the case 
of Minersville Reservoir & Irrigation Company vs. 
Rocky Ford Irrigation Company, 90 Utah 283, 61 Pac. 
(2) 605, to show that a lien exists in favor of the State 
Engineer. However, thiS' case does not construe Sec-
tion 100-5-1, Revi1sed Statutes of Utah 1933, as im-
pressing a lien upon the water right but merely states 
that in a. sense an unpaid water asHessment becomes 
an encumbrance against the water right. The real 
question decided in this case~, as respondents see it, 
is that one who is receiving the beneficial use of the 
water and service of the. State Engineer cannot by 
contract, assignment, or otherwise, free himself from 
the liability to pay the obligation. With this state-
ment we heartily agree and concede that the White 
Fawn Milling Company could not be relieved of the 
obligation it owes by any transfer of its rightls and 
accordingly the receiver has allowed the claim of the 
State Engineer. Likewise, the ne"\v purchaser would 
not assume the obligation nor become bound for the 
same under the wording of the statute. As \Ve have 
heretofore said, the statute clearly indicates that the 
rights that the State Engineer has to collect the money 
or to shut off the water are against the per1son who 
incurs· the same and who obtains the beneficial use of 
his services. 
If the statute does not create a lien, then there 
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can be no question but that the State Engineer's claim 
in the receivership matter would merely be a common 
claim for, as will be noted from the claim set forth in 
appellant's abstract, the preference i!s merely claimed 
under and by virtue of the provisions of Title 100, Re-
vised Statutes of Utah 1933. It is not a claim for labor 
nor for any other item held to be a prior claim in this 
state in receivership matters, and we respectfully sub-
mit that the order of the court denying such claim as 
a preferred claim and allowing it as a common claim 
'vas prope-r. 
If the claim of the State Engineer was not a pre-
ferred claim and did not create a lien then any sub-
sequent purchaser would take title to the land and rights 
to the use of the water without being obligated to take 
care of the obligation created by a prior owner and 
the State Engineer could not collect the same from the 
subsequent owner nor could he deprive him of the use 
of the water. This principle is clearly set forth in the 
annotations appearing in 55 A. L. R. 789 and 13 A. 
L. R. 346, and the case of Home Owners Loan Corpora-
tion vs. Logan Cit~v, 97 Utah 235, 92 Pac. (2d) 346, 
""here thiR court stated: 
"It follows from the above analysis that a 
subsequent purchaser of pre,mises from which 
is cut off the water supply is under no duty to 
pay the arrears owed by a prior tenant or owner 
or both as a condition precedent to having the 
water turned on for use on his property un-
less he has agreed to be liable for the p-ayment 
of the same.'' 
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I~ the ~og~n ~ase, ~ll p~rti(}s ~greed and this 
court helq that th~re was. no lien created by the ordi-
nance ~hough t4e or~inance gave to the city the power 
to shut off the water tm~il all arrears for the water 
furnished had been paid. rhe laJ1gu~ge used in the 
Logan law was: 
'' * "" * may cause the water to be shut off 
from such premises and shall not be required 
to turn the 1same on until all arrears for water 
furnished shall be paid in full. '' 
The state statute in question reads as follows: 
"* "" * may forbid the use of water by 
such delinquent while such default continues.'' 
The language in the ordinance is almost identical 
with that of the statute in question and it is apparent 
therefrom that the State- Engineer received no greater 
right from the words in the statute under discussion 
than the city could have received from the words in 
the ordinance. 
Furthermore, can we say that a lien may be created 
which would in any way bind a subsequent purchaser 
of property unless. some method or provision is made 
for the recording of such lien or the giving of notice 
to the subsequent purchaser that a lien is claimed. Title 
Guaranty & Trust Company vs. Allen, 256 N. Y. Supl. 
400. 
We therefore respeetfully submit: 
1. That in the case of Louis L. Marks vs. White 
Fa'vn Milling Corporation, Defendant, Walker Bank & 
Trust Company as Receiver, and T. H. Hmnphreys, 
State Eng-ineer of the State of Utah, as Appe11ant, 
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the District Court was correct in entering an order 
in the receivership matter ordering that the claim of 
the State Engineer be allowed as a common claim but 
denying that it had any preference over other claims. 
2. That in the case of T. H. Humphreys, State 
Engineer of the State of Utah, plaintiff and appellant, 
and Maxfield Feed & Coal, Inc., defendant and respon-
dent, that the District Court wws correct in entering 
its decree dismissing the suit commenced by plaintiff 
and appellant and contend that this court should af-
firm the decisions of the District Court in both cases. 
EDWARD F. RICHARDS, 
Attorney for Resptondents 
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